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Abstract
E-mail inspection and mitigation systems are necessary in today’s world due
to frequent bombardment of adversarial attacks leverage phishing techniques.
The process and accuracy in identifying a phishing attack present significant
challenges due to data encryption hindering the ability to conduct signature
matching, context analysis of a message, and synchronization of alerts in distributed detection systems. The author recognizes a grand challenge that the
increase in the number of data analysis systems corresponds to an overall increase in the delivery time delay of an e-mail message. This work enhances
PhishLimiter as a solution to combat phishing attacks using machine learning techniques to analyze 27 e-mail features and Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) to optimize network transactions. PhishLimiter uses a two-lane inspection approach of Store-and-Forward (SF) and Forward-and-Inspect (FI)
to distinguish whether traffic is held for analysis or immediately forwarded
to the destination. The results of the work demonstrated PhishLimiter as a
viable solution to combat Phishing attacks while minimizing delivery time of
e-mail messages.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Electronic Mail or E-Mail may be considered the norm for a daily regiment
where users often and periodically read and review their inboxes for a ingest of
correspondence and messages. There are many types of messages a user may
receive regarding online bills, newsletters, advertisements, and spam. phishing
is a technique often leveraged by threat actors. A user receives an e-mail
that consists of a specially crafted message that contains either a malicious
link/attachment or a luring statement. The primary objective of a phishing
attack is to reveal some form of sensitive data such as Personal Identifiable
Information (PII), user credentials, or to entice the recipient to commit an
action such as divulge intellectual properties.
In 2019, Verizon reported that phishing attacks impacted 83% of the global
community and were the results of 32% data breaches [40]. Several organizations have evaluated methods and techniques to deter phishing attempts
from the education approach of Security Education Training and Awareness
(SETA) [17] programs in addition to security-driven detection appliances. The
technology capabilities to deter phishing attacks and related hazardous e-mails
are often mitigated by an inspection and mitigation system such as, but not
limited to, Proofpoint [34], PhishLimiter [10], and PhishNet [35]. A concern
for many e-mail mitigation systems often focuses on performance drawbacks on
receiving and sending a message. Precisely, an e-mail inspection system often
holds a message for analysis before forwarding its content to the final destination once all signatures and heuristic-based detection complete the analysis.
The time a system analyzes e-mail messages creates an impact for both the recipient(s) and the organization’s business operations by delaying the delivery
of an e-mail. The complexity of the e-mail message (e.g. web-code in e-mail
1
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body, file attachment, or message encryption) increases the inspection delay.
This thesis presents an extended approach to PhishLimiter [10] as an enhancement to address the urgency of e-mail delivery while providing a robust
e-mail inspection system to deter phishing attacks. PhishLimter provides a
two-lane inspection approach to detect and mitigate phishing attacks known
as Store-and-Forward (SF) and Forward-and-Inspect (FI). The SF lane carefully inspects the e-mail communication by storing the message in transit on
a virtualized network switch before allowing it to arrive at the recipient’s inbox. The FI addresses the urgency of timely e-mail communication by quickly
forwarding the message in transit to the recipient while creating a copy of the
communication for analysis in a future period. A reputation score of the email communication dictates the lane of inspection where characteristics and
features increase or decrease the value. Machine learning is the critical component to PhishLimiter, where 27 types of features are extracted per e-mail
message ranging from source and destination e-mail address to file attachment
analysis.
The contributions of this research is as follows:
• Enhanced the capabilities and study of PhishLimiter by adding eight
new features for detecting phishing attacks to support newer adversarial
attack methodologies
• Measured inspection timing and delay of the system using five new
datasets with over 500,000 messages for analysis
• Conduct performance analysis of the system through implementation of
load balancing
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes
background information to both phishing and SDN. Chapter 3 describes the
architecture design of the system and methodology of conducting experiments
while Chapter 4 showcases real-world results. Chapter 5 provides discussion
while Chapter 6 concludes the work.

Chapter 2

Background, Challenges, and
Assumptions
This chapter describes background information into the areas of phishing and
SDN.

2.1

Phishing Indicators, Capabilities, and Controls

Adversaries often leverage e-mail communication as one of many entry points
that ultimately end in the total compromise of an enterprise. The MITRE
ATT&CK framework outlines e-mail communication as 3 out of 11 (27%)
methods for Initial Access (i.e., Spearphishing Attachment, Spearphishing
Link, and Spearphishing via Service) [29]. APWG identified 162,155 new
phishing websites for Q4 of 2019 and that the majority (30.80%) of phishing
targets are in SaaS/Webmail [1]. Organizations adopt and integrate several
controls to deter, reduce, or mitigate phishing attacks, summarized into three
technical categories: Infrastructure, Application, and User. Table 2.1 outlines
three areas to implement phishing detection and migration efforts. Lastly, a
top-level view of an organization may include policy-driven controls and governance; however, this thesis focuses directly on the technical works of phishing
detection and mitigation efforts.

2.1.1

Phishing Indicators

The most prevalent and common form of Phishing attacks appears in e-mail
communication [1, 14]. There are numerous methods and characteristics that
3
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Table 2.1: Comparative review of recent phishing mitigation technologies
Category
Definition
Challenges & Limitation
Infrastructure Resides within a net- Difficult to evaluate encrypted
[4, 10]
work and evaluates or data without an ability to deinspects relevant pack- crypt messages and presents arets related to phish- eas of concern for network coning attacks and e-mail gestion and through degradacommunication
tion.
Application
Local to a program or Mitigation limited to endpoint
[25]
system that interfaces security solutions such as anwith the end-user to de- tivirus, anti-malware, and data
ter or mitigate phishing loss prevention.
e-mail and related correspondence
User
Training,
awareness, Poised to judgement of deter[15, 42]
and knowledge transfer mining the validity of e-mail
methods to improve communication when all other
the overall end-users’ controls and defeated. Limability
to
identify ited by security education and
and mitigate phishing awareness programs.
attacks
when
network and application
controls fail
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indicate the purpose of an e-mail message (e.g., normal user communication
or malicious intentions). Identifying phishing e-mail communication summarizes into two primary categories: (1) Signature Detection using static signature matching and (2) Dynamic analysis leveraging techniques from machine
learning and other automated testing capabilities [10].
Signature Detection
Phishing campaigns often target two groups of individuals: (1) wide mass email communication where an adversary sends a message to any known user
and (2) tailored and specifically targeted individuals. The quantity of each
phishing victim varies between the adversary’s intent, the overall objective,
and the level of covertness for a phishing campaign. The first aspects of signature detection for e-mail communication offers a series of benefits to provide
known and common phishing attacks. Table 2.2 outlines example areas of an
e-mail message where signature detection applies.
Machine Learning
String matching and Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) offers the ability to identify
known and frequent phishing attacks but lack the ability to detect new and
emerging threats from sophisticated attackers [10, 11, 26]. Machine learning
offers the ability to analyze e-mail communication through detailed analysis
such as lexical features [4], predictive blacklisting [35], and keyword analysis
on web code [16]. Several challenges emerge from leveraging string matching
techniques for scenarios where an adversary implements evasive techniques
such as data encoding and obfuscation [39] where detection systems are unable
to identify and match the phishing attack.

2.1.2

Adversarial Capabilities and Mitigation Controls

A successful phishing campaign leads to several outcomes where a threat actor
often achieves their primary objective or further their progress (i.e., persistent
foothold [29]) to achieving the end goal—the following present two cases of
outcomes from Phishing attacks.
Data Loss
A common result of a successful phishing campaign focuses on data loss. User
credentials, trade secrets, and Personal Identifiable Information (PII) are some
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of the many outcomes from a successful phishing campaign. Additional layers
of protection or compensating controls may be included in an environment
to protect computer systems from data loss. Some technologies for data loss
prevention include context-aware cloud [31] and text-classification [24] approaches. One challenge to the overall approaches lacks the ability to adapt
the analysis of data encryption where an adversary may ultimately exfiltrate
data over an encrypted medium (channel).
Browser Exploitation to Code Execution
A highly motivated and sophisticated threat actor would attempt to gain
access to the underlying computer system that reviewed a phishing e-mail.
Gaining access to the computer system through exploitation techniques often
leverages 0-Day or n-day style tools. An outdated web browser presents a
potential area for exploitation where the known vulnerability may be leveraged
to gain code execution on the underlying computer system. There are several
publicly accessible tools to compromise outdated browsers [28], where phishing
attacks may be an initial pathway to gain access to a computer system. A
URL in an e-mail message presents a significant concern as a susceptible user
may haphazardly click on the link, thereby allowing their computer system
to browse to a website that hosts exploitation code. In-depth analysis using
machine learning on URLs [10] and domain names [11, 26] offers the ability
to identify malicious links. User education and training are also necessary as
a method to reduce the potential risk of a link being clicked. Arachchilage
et al. [2] sampled a set of participants (n=20) in their ability to identify and
avoid phishing attacks using a mobile application. Participants improved 28%
in identifying suspicious messages after receiving training indicating a partially
effective solution.

2.2

Software-Defined Networking Communication

Several researched works [7, 8, 10, 11, 26] for detecting and deterring malicious
activities identified effective solutions. A critical component to SDN over
traditional networking efforts involves the programmability aspects in which
customize development solutions interfaces with the overall environment [20].
SSDN presents the case where modifications of network flows and traffic allow
for increased performance through optimization efforts [9]. Leveraging framework approaches [22] allows for an improved security posture and the ability to
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defend against phishing attacks, thereby protecting the overall organization.
This work aims to leverage SDN capabilities to optimize further and deter
Phishing attacks.

2.3

Research Challenges

Data encryption is often the primary contender to circumvent and defeat detection systems [10]. Several research [6,10] offers robust approaches to providing
a method for deep packet inspection for encrypted communication channels—
the following present two challenges in this work.
E-Mail Communication Emulation
There are several datasets [19,27,32,36,37] that offer a vast quantity of e-mail
messages ranging from normal, spam, and phishing data types. A challenge in
conducting experiments involve involves disseminating messages within each
data set, emulating the vast number of clients, and replaying the message in
conformance with e-mail communication techniques using Internet Message
Access Protocol (IMAP) and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). Moreover, the use of secure communication variants such as IMAPS and SMTPS
presents challenges by themselves for inspecting e-mail messages as traditional
detection systems do not present the ability to conduct signature matching
without the use of certificate pinning. This work describes techniques to emulate e-mail messages and handling secure communication in Sub Sections 3.3.2
and 3.3.3, respectively.
SFBuffer Allocation and Constraints
PhishLimiter leverages a two-lane approach in analyzing and inspecting network traffic. The SF lane for inspection requires a queuing process to hold
messages for analysis, depending on the system resource specifications. The
inspection system’s lifespan may endure a situation where a burst of e-mail
messages enter the overall detection system, thereby presenting a queuing process for analysis due to resource constraints. The queue of messages presents
challenges for situations of a mailing list; spam messages addressed to a significant number of users, or automated systems providing e-mail-based alerting.
The process of holding a message may significantly detriment the ability to
effectively conduct analysis and inspection for the presence of high urgency
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situations. Sub Section 3.1.2 addresses these challenges to support the overall
function of PhishLimiter.

2.4

Research Assumptions

This work considers one assumption to address the reality of specialized email communication methods that circumvents the detection capabilities of
PhishLimiter.
Pretty Good Privacy
E-mail communication using Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [21] is trusted and
safe as both the sender and recipient have conducted a key exchange to validate
one another for secure e-mail communication. Adding a “third key” for email correspondence violates the intention of PGP and that the information
is visible for both parties and the organization who manages the detection
system. For this case of PGP, either party needs a private key or computer
system with the private key compromise for a potential avenue of a Phishing
attack.
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Table 2.2:
Signature
Sender E-Mail
Address

Areas of an e-mail message for signature detection
Description
Challenges
The originating source Adversary may spoof the infore-mail address (“from” mation to trick or mislead a
field) of the message
susceptible user
Subject Line
Short term phrases The presence of HTML code in
that elevate the ur- the subject line may change the
gency of an e-mail
appearance such as italic format which may confuse static
string matching approaches
Message Body
Content of the mes- Numerous methods and techsage containing HTML nique are necessary to identify
code, hyperlinks to po- malicious activities. Matchtential malicious web- ing URL presents a challenge
sites, or a convincing where mixture of web code and
story to trick the user hyperlink data to purposely
to commit an action as evade detection for analysis
part of a social engineering campaign
File
Attach- An accompanying file Significant variation of files and
ments
that arrives with an methods of execution from an
e-mail message where executable, office macro, or
the user may subcon- documents that leverages an
sciously execute mal- exploit. File encryption may
ware or malicious code create false positives due to
misinterpretation of data analysis. Size of file varies between
e-mail environment and defined
by e-mail server (e.g., file attachment quota)
E-Mail Header The metadata informa- Corresponding an e-mail mestion of the e-mail mes- sage to the originating server
sage where data such may present a challenge for aras originating server eas of e-mail spoofing. False
address and whether positives are plausible for cases
particular
security where an organization utilizes
features are enabled an e-mail gateway or third(i.e., Sender Policy party filtering service [34]
Framework (SPF), and
DomainKeys Identified
Mail (DKIM))

Chapter 3

Methodology
Detecting and mitigating phishing attacks rely on three categories of detection:
Infrastructure, Application, and User, whereas this thesis primarily focuses on
the Infrastructure perspective to address the implementation and effectiveness
of PhishLimiter. This chapter describes the overall architecture of PhishLimiter and the techniques to address load balancing, scalability, and inspection
of encrypted e-mail communication. Figure 3.1 shows an overview of PhishLimiter’s design where (1) a user sends an e-mail, (2) PhishLimiter designates
a path for inspection using a reputation score (see section 3.1), (3) the message undergoes evaluation for maliciousness, (4) sent to an e-mail server for
storage, and finally (5) the recipient retrieves the message.
PhishLimiter
Store + Forward

Sender

E-Mail Server

Forward + Inspect

Receiver

Figure 3.1: A high level overview of PhishLimiter’s architecture [10]

3.1

Inspection Lanes

PhishLimiter directs network traffic to traverse through one of two paths for
inspection. EEach path adopts separate ideologies and motivations to address an organization’s performance demands while maintaining a security
10
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level. The Store and Forward (SF) path is the de facto selection when new,
never before seen, communication occurs in addition to users who have a low
reputation score. The SF path holds messages into a queue within PhishLimiter, inspects the message for maliciousness, and then forwards it to the
appropriate destination if deemed safe. The Forward and Inspect (FI) pathway adopts a separate approach where messages are immediately forwarded
to the destination upon arrival. At the same time, PhishLimiter generates a
copy of the message for future analysis. The FI pathway requires a reputation
score that exceeds an administrative defined threshold with a positive rating.
Lastly, both pathways leverage a kernel module to handle and analyze traffic
on virtual networking switches.

3.1.1

Virtual Switch Kernel Module

PhishLimiter employs two pathways for inspection. The handling of e-mail
communication requires PhishLimiter to hold and replicate messages in transit
for SF and FI, respectively. Netfilter [41] provides the ability to process data
as it enters a network interface. Figure 3.2 shows an overview of the kernel
module with PhishLimiter for data inspection. Step (1) indicates network
Open vSwitch + PhishLimiter
INPUT
1

DATA IN

OUTPUT
3

PREROUTING

POSTROUTING

4

DATA OUT

2

FORWARD
A

B

E

F

Netﬁlter
PhishLimiter

Reputation Lookup
D

Store and Forward

Forward and Inspect

C

G

Floodlight + PhishLimter

Figure 3.2: An overview of the netfilter module for SF and FI inspection
traffic entering the device for inspection, such as a virtual switch. The traffic
consists of both regular network data such as web and e-mail communication
(phishing and regular correspondence). A hook event (a Netfilter function call
to conduct custom processing of information) occurs in Netfilter that queries
the reputation of the traffic to determine the path selection, as indicated in
Step (2). Traffic with inadequate or lack of a reputation score undergoes
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inspection in the SF lane while the remaining goes to FI. Step (B) and (C)
present the SF process in which a delay or latency impacts the e-mail delivery
time due to the step to hold a message. Step (D) denotes the process to analyze
and identify the reputation of the traffic where benign (positive) messages
proceed to Step (E). PhishLimiter drops messages with poor reputation scores
(not shown in the figure). An alternative solution presents the case where an
e-mail inspection system sends messages to a quarantine location for userreview. At the same time, this work does not evaluate such a case to focus
primarily on the detection accuracy and performance of PhishLimiter. Step
(3) shows sending the message beyond the Netfilter module and onward to
the destination (4). Under the FI approach of PhishLimiter, Step (F) and (G)
represent the process where traffic replication occurs for analysis. At the same
time, the module immediately forwards the original message to the destination
via Step (3) and (4). A lane selection process determines whether traffic goes
to SF or FI as follows.

3.1.2

Lane Selection Process

PhishLimiter depends on a reputation score and an administrative threshold to determine the pathway selection for network traffic. Feature extraction through machine learning provides insight in determining the reputation
or trustworthiness of a network flow. Malicious traffic decreases the overall
score of the network flow, while non-malicious increases the overall reputation.
The administrative threshold indicates the fundamental trigger on whether
traffic enters SF or FI.
Reputation Score
The trustworthiness of an e-mail message depends on a combination of user
judgment and signature matching. Malicious e-mail communication negatively
affects the overall reputation score. The previous work [10] indicated the
method to calculate the reputation score while Algorithm 1 provides a brief
pseudo code.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo code indicating reputation score calculations
F : An SDN flow
pkt: A network packet of any size
So : The original score prior to inspection
Su : The updated PhishLimiter Score
M = (): A set of e-mail messages for analysis
c = 0: A numerical counter
E(): A function to extract payload data from a packet and returns raw text
P (): A function for PhishLimiter feature extractions that returns a 1 or -1 for
benign or malicious, respectively
procedure Score Analysis(So,i ,Fi )
for each pkt in F do
Mc = Mc + E(pkt);
if pkt = END OF STREAM then
c=c+1
end if
end for
Su = So
for i = 0, i < length(M ), i++ do
Su = Su + P (Mi )
end for
return Su
end procedure
The transaction of network traffic is grouped into SDN flows as designated
by F . Multiple flows exist in the environment hence Fi and may contain
multiple messages M . The END OF STREAM indicates the end of a message
or packet pkt either by the termination or timeout of a TCP stream. Function
E() indicates the extraction of the payload of pkt where a partial segment
of a message exist (Mc ). The entire message undergoes a process of feature
extraction where the results indicate the outcome of the maliciousness of the
flow. The outcome returns an updated score, thereby indicating the decision
of future traffic to go through SF or FI and defined by an administrative
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threshold.
Administrative Threshold
The underlying decision making or choice to determine whether network traffic
traverses through SF or FI depends on the reputation score compared to the
administrative threshold. A network flow utilizes the SF lane if the reputation
score goes below the administrative threshold. Likewise, positive and normal
e-mail communication increases the score to a point where PhishLimiter allows FI’s usage. The administrative threshold value varies between network
topology, the amount of daily e-mail traffic, and compensating controls if a
malicious e-mail arrives at the end user’s inbox from the FI lane. The threshold value varies base on the use case as do the upper and lower bounds of the
overall score base on the number of false positives generated or performance
behaviors in the environment.
Store and Forward (SF)
Storing a message requires system resources on an inspection device to hold the
information in a temporary location. The SF lane leverages the PREROUTING
mechanic in Netfilter to store a message in memory while PhishLimiter processes and analyze the data to determine the maliciousness of an e-mail. The
demand and volume of e-mail messages may significantly increase to a point
where the resource requirements exceed the amount of memory available. Section 3.2 addresses the scalability and the sudden burst of messages in detail
while Figure 3.3 expresses the logic on SF. The architecture of PhishLimiter
stores queued e-mails for analysis in the SFBuffer, where the resource location
operates on the virtual network switch. A concern for the SFBuffer involves
the threat of a buffer overflow attack as e-mail messages vary in quantity. Email messages are often sent using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) for
data reliability and handling. Network transmission throughput is bounded
by inter-network devices and the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) per
system. The constraints of TCP and MTU splits a single e-mail message into
smaller segments, thereby, presents a challenge for PhishLimiter to conduct
analysis. Precisely, packets arrive into the SFBuffer within the SF lane in
real-time, where PhishLimiter reforms the entire message for analysis. A large
e-mail message requires packet segmentation due to the restrictions bounded
by the MTU and inter-network devices. The arrival of each segment of a
message differs from network congestion, packet loss, or issues from packets
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Figure 3.3: Store and Forward (SF) logic diagram

arriving out of order. The SFBuffer factors such situations by holding a message in queue until a timeout occurs by the design of TCP. Analysis of the
message occurred upon the completion of the entire transmission and that the
SFBuffer concurrently holds messages in real-time. Feature Extraction occurs
once an e-mail message ultimately arrives into the SFBuffer, where PhishLimiter carefully inspects and analyzes the information for any indicators of
malicious activity. The outcome of the analysis either increases or decreases
the overall reputation score in Score Analysis. The concluding step of SF permits the e-mail to arrive at the recipient or drops the message to protect the
user. Positive rated reputation scores allow the user to leverage the FI lane
to increase performance on e-mail handling and communication.
Forward and Inspect (FI)
There are certain situations where e-mail messages have a level of urgency that
requires minimal delivery time, such as emergency response, executive-level decision making, or time-sensitive collaboration work. The SF lane holds messages in transit for inspection but presents the concern of increase latency when
the detection system becomes resource constraint or overburden by events. FI
factors a level of trustworthiness for the user by quickly forwarding the message to the destination upon arrival to the inspection system. PhishLimiter
replicates the message for analysis at a later time in the PREROUTING mechanic
of Netfilter. Figure 3.4 shows the logic behind FI. A user transmits an e-mail
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Figure 3.4: Forward and Inspect (FI) logic diagram

message where the reputation of the flow has a positive rating. PhishLimiter replicates and forwards the message upon arrival to the destination when
using Forward-and-Inspect (FI). Feature Extraction occurs on the replicated
message to determine whether any indications of malicious activities such as
malware or exploitation code. The overall reputation score of the network
flow decreases when PhishLimiter identifies malicious activities to inspect the
data. The comparison between SF and FI presents one area of concern: malicious e-mail messages are automatically forwarded to the destination as the
overall trade-off to decrease delivery time. The forwarding of a potentially
malicious e-mail message ultimately presents a risk when adopting a scenario
of PhishLimiter. At the same time, many endpoint systems utilize compensating controls and technologies (e.g., endpoint security) to protect the user
from malware cases.

3.2

Load Balancing at Scale

System resources often limit inspection and detection systems at any scale
due to the rate and quantity of network traffic. Many commercial products
commonly provide statistics [23] on their detection system (appliance) with
a standardized Packets Per Second (PPS) value that defines the maximum
throughput allowed before a delay occurs. Combating the limitation of systems
resources requires a set of distributed computing and load balancing efforts.
Load balancing configurations often endure the challenge of synchronization
of analysis and alerting, whereas in the case of PhishLimiter—a reputation
score must be maintained across all devices. Figure 3.5 shows an example
case of three types of load balancing efforts with PhishLimiter. The first
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Figure 3.5: A load balancing distribution architecture indicating duplication
of SF, FI, and PhishLimiter inspection

example type (Load Balance1 ) presents an initial area of concern with the
design of PhishLimiter, where the SF holds a message in memory (SFBuffer)
for analysis. The increase or burst of network traffic fundamentally presents
the scenario of a queue that increases over time. Adding or increasing the
number of SF lanes allows for parallel processing of multiple e-mail messages,
minimizing the overall queuing time of a message that would otherwise be held
in the SFBuffer.
The second example type (Load Balance2 ) presents the case of multiple
FI systems where conditions of burst or a high volume of e-mail messages
prolong the overall inspection time. Areas of concern focus on a malicious email message reaching the intended recipient. Severe resource constraints of FI
delay the inspection time by factors of several minutes, hours, or indefinitely.
The last example type (Load Balance3 ) depicts the scenario of multiple
PhishLimiter instances where the area of concern focuses on network latency
and redundancy. A network topology that presents an environment with scalability concerns or high network latency constraints when the topology endures
a situation where users send an e-mail message to a centralized mailing service. Users that are the most considerable distance (geographical or network
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hops) often endure significantly high network latency and potential network
loss when communicating to a centralized service. Multiple PhishLimiter instances allow for the deployment of the inspection system in multiple locations
of a network, thereby reducing the overall delay gain through network latency.
Each three example cases of (Load Balance1,2,3 presents the overall implementation challenges of PhishLimiter but did not address the concern of handling
the result of each inspection lane and centralizing the overall reputation score
of e-mail communication in a global scale.
An Inter-Node Communication (INC) pathway allows each instance of a
load balancing appliance (PhishLimiter) to report modifications to the overall
reputation score for e-mail traffic. The communication effort utilizes the Control Plane of the SDN environment to protect the overall reputation score
changes of the network flow while leveraging a client-server model for multiple devices (e.g., inspection lanes). The selection of the network path and the
deployment of a load balancing system differ between network topology/environment. The decision to implement more than one SF or FI depends on
system resource constraints on PhishLimiter, network throughput of entering
and exiting links, and Quality-of-Service (QoS) policies (e.g., prioritized traffic
that has higher urgency or requirement over e-mail traffic).
Selection Process
SDN groups network traffic into “flows”, where one or more e-mail messages
may belong to one flow. A load balancer [13] redirects traffic in an optimal method to reduce the overall concern of system resource and network
constraints. Leveraging SDN, as the primary method for communication,
presents significant advantages to an overall network. However, challenges
are presented where multiple e-mail messages arrive under one flow (i.e., mailing list, Phishing, or spam). There are two load balancing (Round Robin and
Resource Utilization Selection) for PhishLimiter, as described as follows:
Round-Robin (RR): SDN distinguishes network traffic by flows, and that
multiple e-mail messages may originate from one source (e.g., router or email server). The selection of using RR provides simplicity as a network
flow naturally increases and decreases in the quantity of traffic over time.
Alternating between entry points to PhishLimiter (e.g., SF, FI, or another
PhishLimiter instance) simplifies the case with load balancing without the
needed overhead to monitor resource utilization on each system frequently.
Using RR presents one area of concern where a flow expires when an SDN
switch does not observe any traffic after a defined period such that one system
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becomes overburden while another idles.
Resource Utilization Selection (RUS): The Control plane of SDN allows for
the communication of SDN devices to construct flows and manage the overall
ecosystem of the network. Load Balancing efforts while monitoring resource
utilization of SDN switches and particularly PhishLimiter, allows for a more
precise method of balancing network traffic. One area of concern in monitoring resource utilization pertains to the overall overhead gained by querying
each networking device and the frequency to obtain the measurements. E-mail
communication is often small and sort duration network streams (e.g., flows).
The rapid succession of multiple e-mail messages presents the concern of excessive query time and tracking of resource utilization across the network. For
example, a user sends an e-mail message where the controller inserts a network flow base upon a series of path selection methods and the decision of
the load balancer using RUS. Multiple e-mail messages may require multiple
network-flows, thereby requiring a query of each network device for resource
utilization on a per-flow basis to define the optimal pathway to support load
balancing effort.

3.3

Phishing Features and Extraction

The arrival of an e-mail undergoes a series of feature extraction methods by
PhishLimiter to determine the maliciousness of a message. Figure 3.6 provides
a brief overview of some of the techniques used in feature extraction while
Appendix A outlines the comprehensive metrics.

Users

PhishLimiter: Feature Extraction

Subject Line

Message Content

URL Lexicon

E-Mail

Message

Reputation

Domain Record

Network Location

Server

Network

Source Code

Script

Templates
Web

Figure 3.6: Categorization of features for PhishLimiter analysis
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Feature Extraction Categories

There are three areas of analysis that PhishLimiter categorizes for feature
extraction when determining the maliciousness of an e-mail message. The
following provides a brief description of each category, while a comprehensive
list of features is given in Appendix A.
Message
The specifics of an e-mail include subject line, message body (content), file
attachments, e-mail headers, sender information, and the intended (recipient) location. Each section of an e-mail message comprises of areas where
an attacker may leverage to compromise a user or gain valuable information
ultimately. The subject line of an e-mail message contains a title or topic of
the message. A subset of users often use the subject line as a quick method
to convey information without a message body and often indicated with the
phrase “end of message” or “eom”. The e-mail header provides indications of
metadata or information about the validity of an e-mail message, such as the
IP address originating e-mail server to identify spoofing attempts. Lastly, file
attachments is a ubiquitous method to send and deliver malware to a targeted
individual or organization. Analysis of a file attachment determines the overall
risk of an e-mail message, whether the attachment is an excel document with
a macro, an executable file, or a normal word document.
Network
An e-mail message contains information about the sender (e.g., the author
as denoted by the e-mail address in the “from” field), thereby indicating the
domain name and the network of origin. The domain name by itself accompanies a set of registration data that provides vital information for analysis.
The whois record provides data such as the creation and update date of the
domain name (e.g., when the domain was first created and the date of last
modification for the whois entry), the point-of-contact for the domain name,
and registration authority. Many conventional domain reputation systems
such as Bluecoat [38] categorizes domain names to groupings such as “Education” or “Shopping.” Part of the categorization process involves manual user
input through crowdsourcing efforts. A domain name with a history of malicious activities receives a harmful category such as “Phishing” by Bluecoat,
thereby preventing organizations from accessing any computer system in that
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domain. One concern with such a system is the frequency of updating the category as domain names expire over time while the Bluecoat category persists.
A popular website, expireddomains.net [18], allows adversaries to harvest and
collect reputable domain names where the previous owner failed to renew their
subscription or let expire. PhishLimiter aims to solve the concern of reputable
domain names being transferred to the ownership of an adversary by analyzing
a per e-mail transaction or periodic basis.
Web
Receiving an e-mail message often contains a hyperlink to a web server (either
malicious or benign). An analysis of the website further improves the overall
detection by validating that the intended page does not indicate potential
malicious activities. Examples of areas of concern include source code analysis
using signature matching, image analysis (e.g., matching the image of the
website), and template matching (e.g., comparing source code to the existing
website within an organization).

3.3.2

Phishing Dataset and Training

PhishLimiter’s underlying technology leverages machine learning to quickly
and decisively determine the maliciousness of an e-mail message. Using a set
of sample e-mail messages for training purposes improves the effectiveness and
accuracy of the model to optimize the system further. Table 3.3.2 outlines a
series of datasets used for training PhishLimiter. Each data set presents a
combination of known malicious, spam, or benign e-mail messages but lacks
messages with file attachments. Mozilla provides a set of test files [30] commonly used to conduct software fuzzing for web browsers. In contrast, for the
case of PhishLimiter–the files present a sample of benign e-mail messages with
file attachments for analysis. Normal e-mail communication (non-phishing) is
also necessary for analysis as false positives reflect weak indications for a detection system. Figure 3.7 provides an overview of the training process for the
model. There are 26 features for analysis as defined by Appendix A. Benign or
malicious traffic result in either a +1 (+) or -1 (-), respectively—the outcome
of the training results in a set of numerical values that formulate the overall
model. Previous work [10] compared detection accuracy amongst numerous
machine learning models from Deep Convolution Neural Network to J48 while
this study leverages an Artificial Neural Network as the method for purpose
of identifying performances with load balancing and data encryption analysis.
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Table 3.1: E-Mail dataset for machine learning training
# Name
Description
Challenges
01 Enron [19]
A 1.7GB reposi- E-mail messages are fortory of e-mail mes- mated in x.y.z format
sages between 150
employees
02 Mail-Archive [27]
A collection of A website host the dataset/over two decades content and require web
of e-mail com- scraping
and
recursive
munication
and download of messages
mailing list
03 SpamAssassin [37] A combination of Each e-mail message are
multiple sets of stored in individual text
e-mail
messages files and marked with incontaining spam dicators of spam or ham
and ham (non- making the only challenge
spam) messages. is a method to replay mesRepository stores sages to a destination ee-mail messages in mail server through Phishindividual files
Limiter
04 Lingspam [36]
A 62.9MB repos- No indications of source
itory of text files or destination e-mail adcontaining a 2,893 dresses as the text files
e-mail messages
are purely message body
of an e-mail. Additionally,
all URLs in the dataset
have spaces added into
each value such as http
: / / www . creditime
. com in spmsga141.txt
thereby requiring a matching method to identify
links
05 EmailIntent [32]
A
repository No indications of source or
of 4,649 single destination e-mail addresses
expressions
or as dataset is two text files
sentences accom- text files are purely message
panied
by
an body of an e-mail. Ground
indicator of a Yes truth provided with Yes/No
or No value desig- indicator to support detecnating a benign or tion accuracy
malicious message,
respectively
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Figure 3.7: A high level depiction of training where the dashed-lined objects
are used to define weights for the model and dotted-line represent the implementation of PhishLimiter

Lastly, the experiments used the value of increasing or decreasing the score
(e.g., +1 or -1) to simplify the results while PhishLimiter allows for a more
significant number to modify the score.

3.3.3

Encrypted Communication Analysis

Network communication that leverages encryption such as TLS presents a significant challenge as detection systems are unable to read the content of the
message without a decryption key. E-mail messages and the exchange of e-mail
communication often leverage encryption to protect messages from being tampered or modified by an adversary. Certificate Pinning [5] allows an inspection
system to decrypt, analyze, and encrypt a message without user interaction.
PhishLimiter presents two inspection lanes where the SF lane requires the
message encrypted after analysis for delivery to the end-user. In FI, the user
has already received a message before inspection, thereby not needing to encrypt the message after analysis. The implementation of certificate pinning
requires the receiving e-mail server (destination) to trust a certificate shared
with PhishLimiter. Specifically, both the e-mail server and inspection systems
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share a generated certificate that allows for the analysis of messages over an
encrypted channel. The justification for this particular configuration mimics
industry implementation of internal certificate authorities. Lastly, this work
does not focus on any network devices beyond an e-mail server (e.g., end-user
system) as the work primarily focuses on e-mail messages.

3.4

Deployment Strategies

The architectural design of PhishLimiter offers two methods for deployment
and testing. One (hybrid) operates within a virtual networking switch, and
the other (standalone) uses a separate system to process network traffic. The
following describes the advantages of each strategy, while Figure 3.8 provides
a high-level overview.
A
Switch + PhishLimiter

Users

B

1

4

Switch

2

E-Mail Server

3

Legend
Standalone
Hybrid

PhishLimiter

Figure 3.8: A high level overview of deployment strategies for PhishLimiter

Hybrid
PhishLimiter resides within a virtual networking switch where concerns are
raised on resource requirements, the analysis of PhishLimiter, and the overall
risk for the inspection system (switch). Figure 3.8 shows the example case
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where Step (A) indicates e-mail messages entering the hybrid model where
the unified system endures the constraint of forwarding network traffic and
inspecting e-mail messages. Step (B) denotes the hybrid model’s output where
an e-mail message arrives at an e-mail server. Concerns are raised under the
hybrid model where a failure of PhishLimiter or the switching capability causes
a total failure of the network path. Advantages to such a method address
networks with significantly low throughput rates, high latency, or packet loss.
Standalone
Unlike the hybrid approach, PhishLimiter resides on a separate system from
the virtual switching device, requiring additional forwarding of traffic from
the switch. Multiple switches may forward traffic to PhishLimiter under this
approach, reducing the overall resource requirement of networking switches.
Step (2) and (3) denote the forwarding of traffic into and out of PhishLimiter,
where additional overhead occurs from network latency. The advantages of
such a method allow multiple switches to communicate to a centralized, highperformance system running PhishLimiter. In contrast, system failures within
the network minimize the overall impact (e.g., one verse both systems).

3.5

Testing Environment

Testing PhishLimiter required a combination of network systems, virtualization technologies, and data. In the previous work [10], the Global Environment
for Network Innovation (GENI) [3] was leveraged as a real-world testbed solution for analysis due to the ability to measure network latency across multiple,
federated computer systems while conducting network transactions over the
public Internet. In this work, a high-performance system was leveraged to purposely focus on the accuracy of data analysis and inspection of PhishLimiter.
The following denotes the hardware specifications for the testing environment:
2x Intel E5-2660 @ 2.2 GHz (32-Cores), 192 GB Memory, 30 TB of Hard Drive
Space in ZFS with L2Arc/SLOG configuration, and 40Gbps network interfaces
(virtual).

3.5.1

Network Topology

PhishLimiter leverages several virtualization technologies to support the identification and deterrence of Phishing attacks. Figure 3.9 depicts the topology
to support experimental evaluation efforts. Sender-1, Sender-2, and Sender-3
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Experimental Evaluation Network Topology
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Figure 3.9: Network topology diagram for experimental evaluation

are exact duplicates of one another and serve the purpose of transmitting email messages to the e-mail server. Network traffic enters the Load Balancer
and traverses through either PhishLimiter-1 or PhishLimiter-2. The outcome
of the e-mail transmission arrives at the e-mail server if not deemed malicious.
Additionally, all network links in the diagram operate at 1 Gbps throughput to
model standard network configurations where the diagram indicates two layers
of SDN (e.g., Infrastructure and Control). Network IP addresses are statically
assigned to simplify testing purposes. Lastly, all devices within PhishLimiter1 and PhishLimiter-2 connect to the Control plane as per the design of SDN.
Following the network, topology is the description of each machine and its
configuration for conducting experiments.

3.5.2

System Configuration and Specifications

The network topology diagram expressed several virtual systems in conducting
experiments. Previous works [10, 11, 26] presented cases of data transmission
and configuration while the following express essential design requirement for
this study with references to Figure 3.9.
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Sender-X and E-Mail Server
Three computer systems transmit e-mail traffic to the environment denoted
as Sender-1, Sender-2, and Sender-3. Each system houses a local copy of
the datasets listed for the analysis, as indicated from Table 3.3.2 in Subsection 3.3.2 above. Each VM operates 1 core and 2 GB of memory with Ubuntu
18.04.4 as the operating system. Graphical interfaces for the systems are not
configured as each Sender system merely transmits e-mail messages to the
receiving e-mail server. The e-mail server for this study merely receives messages, has a 1 core and 2 GB memory design to match the client, and uses
Postfix as the software. No e-mail inboxes are configured on the server and
will automatically delete messages upon arrival to conserve system resources.
SDN Controller
The Controller for the SDN environment operates Floodlight [20] as the software solution. The network topology presented nine devices that require management from the Controller (Load Balancer, OVS, SF, and FI). The VM operating Floodlight uses 1 core and 4 GB of memory with Ubuntu 18.04.4 as
the operating system of choice. The configuration of Floodlight follows the
default deployment from the code repository [20]. The VM exposes the REST
API interface of Floodlight to allow PhishLimiter to interact with the SDN
environment, thereby allowing flow manipulation and directing traffic from SF
to FI and vice-versa.
PhishLimiter, Load Balancer, OVS, SF, and FI
The architecture of the experimental evaluation utilizes Open vSwitch [33]
as the selected virtual switching platform for ease of deployment, development flexibility [11, 26], and popularity amongst research work [7, 8, 10]. The
Load Balancer [13] utilizes a Round Robin approach between two instances
of PhishLimiter to contrast the overall accuracy of PhishLimiter while identifying potential resource constraints (e.g., the overburden of an instance). All
systems are connected to the Controller using the control plane of the network
as per the SDN design. Lastly, SF and FI maintain a connection to the system
running PhishLimiter per design for updates on score and reporting. System
resource specifications for these systems are set at 1 core and 4GB of memory
with Ubuntu 18.04.4.

Chapter 4

Results
This chapter presents the evaluation of PhishLimiter to express the overall
solution’s effectiveness using a real-world testing environment. Further results
are shown regarding measurements and samples of performance, timing, and
accuracy of experiments that portray the overall ability to protect an environment from potential Phishing attacks.

4.1

Performance Analysis

This study presented the challenge that traditional e-mail inspection systems
delay and prolong the delivery of an e-mail message due to the many steps
necessary for data analysis. PhishLimiter presented a two-lane inspection
approach to combat some performance concerns. The following describes the
deep level timing analysis and a study on the overall communication behaviors
and patterns for the SF and FI lanes.

4.1.1

E-Mail Delivery Timing and Delay

The nature of the SF lane within PhishLimiter introduces a delay as messages are held for analysis before being forwarded to the destination (if not
malicious). The Lingspam dataset [36] contains 10 folders with 289 text files
(e.g. e-mail messages). Figure 4.1 shows the overall measurement of time the
SF lane where the files are grouped in sets of 17. The Lingspam dataset’s
structure contains ten parts (e.g., folders) as to correspond to the y-axis in
Figure 4.1. Testing transmitted a set of messages (files) across the network
to only the SF lane to identify the induced delay when the analysis holds the
28
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0
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Figure 4.1: E-mail transmission delay on SF lane while the Lingspam Dataset
is leveraged for analysis where the denoted values are averages of all identified
e-mail messages within their respective group
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Figure 4.2: A count on the number of URLs identified in the Lingspam dataset
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e-mail message. The calculation of the delay only focuses on when a message
enters and exists in the SF system. Several cells denote the value of zero,
indicating that the initial inspection of the message was unable to identify
any segment that merit analysis using feature extraction. Part 8’s Group 16
showed the highest delay with a 4.846-second delay. Deep analysis reveals the
following URLs were identified as part of the inspection process. Appendix C
shows the list of URLs identified as part of the analysis for Part 8’s Group 16.
Appendix C indicates a set of regex matching patterns for identifying a URL
and Figure 4.2 shows the number of identified URLs within the Lingspam
dataset. Notably, URLs’ quantity does not appear to correlate to the overall
delay of forwarding message to the destination but rather the complexity of
the domain name, network latency to retrieve web data, and whether the website exists. Part 7’s Group 4 showed a 1,331 ms delay of forwarding a message
with the identification of 12 URLs, while Part 7’s Group 14 experienced a
3,386 ms delay. The evaluation of FI presents additional comparisons against
SF for inspection time and analysis.
Evaluating the time between FI forwarding the message to the destination
and the time the message undergoes inspection presented an interesting comparison. PhishLimiter’s overall risk pertains to FI potentially forwarding a
malicious message to the destination before the inspection. Figure 4.3 shows
a box plot of the approximate time discrepancies analyzing the Lingspam Part
10 data set over ten rounds. Notably, Group 17 indicated 0 delays as no URLs
were identified as to match previous results from Figure 4.2. The highest delay
was noted at almost 1,500 ms delay as to match similar results SF inspection
time. Further analysis was conducted for the time necessary for inspection in
FI after the delivery of the message. Figure 4.4 shows a depiction of an incremental delay for the analysis of 375 messages sent sequentially (e.g., one at a
time). The graph indicates that the inspection time for FI increased slowly
over time while the curve began to plateau between 235 and 275. Sampled
data were fitted using a powerfit with R2 and RMSE at 0.9547 and 0.2588,
respectively. Lastly, system resources was monitored for utilization requirements

4.1.2

Inspection Under Denial-of-Service or Burst E-Mails

A major risk to any inspection system involves the case of Denial-of-Service
(DoS). While FI has some safeguards in the sense that messages are delivered
to the user under such constraint—SF presents the risk that messages are
queued in the SFBuffer waiting for inspection. A deeper study was evaluated
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Inspection Delay in FI for Lingspam Part 10
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Figure 4.3: Inspection time for FI after delivery of an e-mail message
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Figure 4.4: Inspection time for FI after delivery of an e-mail message
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for such a scenario where all datasets were intermixed with one another and
immediately forwarded through PhishLimter to emulate a sudden burst of
network traffic. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show CPU and Memory usage for the
burst scenario, respectively. The CPU usage shown presents a compelling
CPU Usage for Inspection System Under Burst E-Mail Scenario
y vs. x
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Figure 4.5: Inspection system CPU usage under resource constraint from the
burst scenario
Memory Usage for Inspection System Under Burst E-Mail Scenario
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Figure 4.6: Inspection system memory usage under resource constraint from
the burst scenario
case where the immediate burst of e-mail message caused an oversubscription
of system resources per points greater than 100%. Memory usage increased
briefly but subsided over time, indicating little impact on the overall bust of
traffic. The lower and upper bound for CPU usage was 20.5% and 760.5%,
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respectively. Memory usage ranged from the lower and upper bound at 32%
and 49.7%, respectively.

4.1.3

Lane Switching Dynamics

The switching and transitions between SF to FI and vice-versa presents an area
of evaluation for performance and delay. AN SDN flow periodically refreshes
itself for the presence of matching IP addresses and ports in a flow table. A
network flow can never expire due to the continuous stream of e-mail traffic
and data from a particular network (e.g., cloud provider). Switching between
the two inspection lanes for new flows is trivial, as it is merely a network path
configuration within SDN. Manipulation of the flow during the presence of
traffic presence the concern of packet loss or a brief moment in time where
messages are disrupted. Likewise, an e-mail message spans across multiple
packets such that the transition between SF to FI and vice-versa may leave
some portion in one lane and the rest in the other. Figure 4.7 shows the
evaluation of the disruption of network traffic when switching between the
two inspection lanes using Ping. Six measurements indicated a disruption of
ICMP Measurements During Lane Switching (SF to FI)
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Figure 4.7: Network traffic disruption switching between SF and FI
the communication briefly as denoted with a latency of 0 for samples 61 to 66.
The brief disruption is for cases where the lane switching process transitioned
ICMP request and that the switch requires a bi-directional insertion of rules
(e.g., sender to receiver and vice-versa). Traffic may route through FI, while
the return path may traverse through SF during the switching.

Chapter 5

Discussion
The previous chapter identified several positive results demonstrating the effectiveness of PhishLimiter. This chapter presents some discussion on several
assumptions of risk as part of this study with threat modeling.

5.1

Threat Model and Risk

The architecture and design of PhishLimiter present areas of concern when factoring the scenario of a malicious actor having access within the network (e.g.,
inside threat). External to the network, normally expected network attacks
such as Denial-of-Service [8] or the Distributed-variant [7] are often combated
by Content-Delivery-Network (CDN) and DDoS mitigation service such as
Cloudflare [12]. Exploitation efforts such as attacking the e-mail server or a
load balancer are also safeguarded by network firewalls, patch management,
and vulnerability scanning efforts. Attacks that leverage a 0-day exploit are
unavoidable. A secondary or compensating control such as defense-in-depth,
Access-Control List (ACL), and Role-Base Access Controls (RBAC) is necessary to provide a layer of protection. PhishLimiter cannot safeguard such a
style of attacks. A harmonious solution of several types of security systems and
architectures is needed to mitigate and a wide-spread of varying attacks. The
following describes a set of example threats and risk that presents challenges
towards PhishLimiter’s architecture.
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Controller operates an insecure API

Controllers [20] offer the ability to interact with the SDN environment using a
REST API to support the ability of the programmability of a network. Many
API by default configurations remain insecure (e.g., plain text protocol) and
do not require authentication (e.g., unauthenticated access).
Impact: An adversary may manipulate the environment using SDN flow insertion rules, thereby redirecting traffic to a malicious location in the network.
Justification: An adversary gaining access to the control plane of the SDN
environment presents a significant challenge and achievement. Two methods
to gain such access are through a potential pivot from the infrastructure plane
of SDN or by compromising a node with access to the control plane.
Controls: Many controllers offer the ability to enable encryption for their
REST API in addition to leveraging key exchanges and other authentication methods (e.g., LDAP). Lastly, enabling further protection such as HostIntrusion Prevention System (HIPS) and other compensating controls (e.g.,
endpoint protection) minimizes the overall risk further from impacting PhishLimiter.

5.1.2

Time-based Denial of Service (DoS) Attack

A Round-Robin approach of load balancing allows for a potential risk where an
adversary tricks the overall system to route high-volume and malicious traffic
to a single inspection system, thereby causing a significant bottleneck in the
environment.
Impact: The bottleneck delays non-malicious traffic, disrupting end-users receiving e-mail and prolonging message delivery indefinitely.
Justification: An adversary to gain such knowledge on the quantity of SF and
FI systems requires significant inside knowledge of the network environment
and architecture. Additionally, to create such an attack requires an adversary
to control multiple IP addresses that are external to the network environment
operating PhishLimiter as the controller creates a flow per matching source
and destination IP address and port.
Controls: Monitoring of system resources a periodic checking and evaluation
of message delivery time through a Service Level Agreement (SLA) offers a
cause to monitor for then potential DoS attack.
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Forgotten Messages in FI System Failure

The operation of PhishLimiter undergoes a situation where one of the inspection lanes fails due to hardware problems or the underlying operating system.
Impact: This scenario ultimately creates a situation where messages cannot
be delivered to the final destination. In some cases–a user receives a message,
and FI fails before the inspection.
Justification: Organizations naturally experience system failures as part of the
life span of hardware devices, poor software behaviors, or unexpected events.
Computer systems are often monitored for the health and status of the device,
thereby presenting immediate indications for the environment’s failure.
Controls: An organization may implement a monitoring solution to evaluate
an inspection system’s health with an SLA requirement defined by the organization’s risk appetite. Messages arriving at the destination where FI fails to
conduct inspections require a case of a compensating control such as endpoint
security and HIPS.

5.1.4

Reputation Score Inflation

The awareness of PhishLimiter presents the case where an adversary purposely
sends numerous benign messages to boost or inflate the reputation score to a
positive value such that traffic inspection switches from SF to FI.
Impact: It allows for the potential risk of an end-user to receive a severely
malicious e-mail message before inspection in the FI process.
Justification: The study results studied the delay process of inspecting a message under FI, indicating that the time an adversary potentially gains from
any malicious activities results in under a 5-second window.
Controls: Standard safeguards include endpoint protection, RBACS, HIPS,
and user training.

5.1.5

Score Update Replay Attack

An adversary gains access to the SDN environment’s control plane and the
ability to modify and replay reputation score messages.
Impact: The ability to inflate or deflate specific reputation scores of flows in
the environment allows for potential directing of malicious and benign traffic
to FI and SF, respectively.
Justification: To gain such access to the control plane of SDN requires a significant effort by an adversary, as previously mentioned in Sub Section 5.1.1.
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Additionally, the ability to manipulate and replay messages as an approach
of spoofing presence a challenge to interject between SF and FI connection to
PhishLimiter.
Controls: The implementation of authentication or public key validates the
communication channel, thereby preventing potential risk of replay attacks.

Chapter 6

Conclusion
This study presented an extension to PhishLimiter as an approach to improve
the delivery of e-mail communication while combating potential phishing attacks. Traditional e-mail inspection systems hold messages for analysis before
releasing the content to the recipient, thereby establishing a delivery delay.
Users who are sending and receiving e-mail messages with high priority or
time-sensitive urgency may not have the luxury to wait for an e-mail inspection system to complete the analysis. PhishLimiter presented a solution that
dynamically speeds up and decreases the delivery of an e-mail message with a
two-lane inspection approach of Store-and-Forward and Forward-and-Inspect.
The results demonstrated that PhishLimiter presents a viable solution to combat phishing attacks while providing a potential approach to quickly receiving
e-mail messages.
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Appendix A

Machine Learning Features
#

Feature

Description

01 IP
Address

Determines
whether a hyperlink uses an
IP address

02 URL
Length

Determines the
length of the
URL

Implementation
Challenges
Utilizes
string
matching
technique where pattern
matching
may generate a
false positive due
to IPv6 address
shortening
Lengthy
URLs
may indicate a
potential phishing
attempt through
cross-site
scripting, session-token
usage, etc

45

Operational
Risk
N/A

+/-

N/A

-

-
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Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
03 URL
Determine
Shorting
service
Shortener whether
link may mask maliutilizes a short- cious links while
ing service such detection system
as bit.ly
need
to
query
shortener for the
full URL
#

Feature

04 @ Symbol
Usage

05 Sub domain
Usage

06 Domain
Expiration
Date

Determine
whether
link
utilizes the @
symbol as text
prior to the
notation
are
omitted
Determine
whether
sub
domains
are
being
utlizes
and
quantity including
matching
for
organizational
names
Determine
whether
the
domain expires
greater
than
one year

page
Operational
Risk
Actively
querying
a
third-party
service may
flag the detection system
as malicious
due to rate
and interval
of querying
Distinguishing an N/A
e-mail address from
a URL presence
a challenge due
to potential false
positives

+/-

-

N/A

N/A

-

Excessively querying of whois record
may
cause
a
temporary
block
by
third-party
provider due to
rate limiting controls

Querying
a
third-party
may
block
detection
system permanently

+
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Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
07 Domain
Determine
Excessive querying
Creation
whether
the of whois record
Date
domain’s lifes- may block the
pan (creation detection system
date) as newly
created
domain
names
may purposely
host
malicious content
due to poor
or
unknown
reputation
08 Shared IP Determine
Excessive querying
Address
whether mul- of whois record
tiple
domain may block the
names
share detection system
the same IP address through
reserve
DNS
queries
09 Domain
Determine
International and
Name
whether
the foreign languages
Prodomain name may present difnounceand sub do- ficulties and bias
ability
main
name to
the
feature
are
easily depending on the
pronounceable
implementation
approach
and
end-users
#

Feature

47
page
Operational
Risk
Querying
a
third-party
may
block
detection
system permanently

+/+

Querying
a
third-party
may
block
detection
system permanently

-

Creates
a
false positive
for alerting

+
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#
10

11

12

13

Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
Network
Determine
A subset of web
Port
whether
the applications
use
Usage
link utilizes a alternative
ports
non-standard
(i.e.,
8080 and
web port for 8443) while some
accesss
administrative
interfaces use any
network port
Anchor
Determine
N/A
Link
to whether
the
Display
link’s targeted
Text
destination
matches
the
display
text
in the e-mail
message
JavaScript Determine
Code may incorExecution whether
the porate obfuscation
message
has to mislead detecembedded
tion system
JavaScript
code for execution
HTML
Determine
Code may incoriFrame
whether
the porate obfuscation
Usage
message
uti- to mislead deteclizes an iFrame tion system
message
has
embedded
JavaScript
code for execution
Feature

48
page
Operational
Risk
N/A

+/-

N/A

-

N/A

-

N/A

-
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#

Feature

14 Page
Ranking

15 Google
Search
Index

16 Bing
Search
Index

Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
Determine
The ranking must
whether
the be frequently uplink directs to dated to ensure aca
reputable curacy of the detecdomain name tion
using
Alexa
ranking
Determine
Query must be
whether
the done in real-time
domain name against
google
matches a top service
index
rating
using Google
search crawlers

Determine
whether
the
domain name
matches a top
index
rating
using Google
search crawlers

Query must be
done in real-time
against
google
service

49
page
Operational
Risk
N/A

Frequency
of query to
Google may
accidentally
block the detection due to
rate-limiting
and
behavior analysis
from Google’s
detection
system
Frequency
of query to
Google may
accidentally
block the detection due to
rate-limiting
and
behavior analysis
from Google’s
detection
system

+/+

+

+
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#

Feature

17 Domain
Client
Update
Permission

Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
Reputable
Excessive querying
organizations
for whois record
limits
the may result in a
permission
temporary block by
as
prohib- the DNS server
ited while all
other cases–are
suspicious

18 Domain
Client
Transfer
Permission

Reputable
organizations
limits
the
permission
as
prohibited while all
other cases–are
suspicious

Excessive querying
for whois record
may result in a
temporary block by
the DNS server

19 Domain
Client
Delete
Permission

Reputable
organizations
limits
the
permission
as
prohibited while all
other cases–are
suspicious

Excessive querying
for whois record
may result in a
temporary block by
the DNS server

50
page
Operational
Risk
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query

+/-

-

-

APPENDIX A. MACHINE LEARNING FEATURES

#

Feature

20 Domain
Server
Update
Permission

Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
Reputable
Excessive querying
organizations
for whois record
limits
the may result in a
permission
temporary block by
as
prohib- the DNS server
ited while all
other cases–are
suspicious

21 Domain
Server
Transfer
Permission

Reputable
organizations
limits
the
permission
as
prohibited while all
other cases–are
suspicious

Excessive querying
for whois record
may result in a
temporary block by
the DNS server

22 Domain
Client
Delete
Permission

Reputable
organizations
limits
the
permission
as
prohibited while all
other cases–are
suspicious

Excessive querying
for whois record
may result in a
temporary block by
the DNS server

51
page
Operational
Risk
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query

+/-

-

-
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#

Feature

23 Domain
Client
Hold
Status

24 Domain
Whois
Guard

25 GeoIP
Location

Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
Determine
Excessive querying
whether
the for whois record
domain name may result in a
has a hold sta- temporary block by
tus indicating the DNS server
potential legal
issues

Determines
whether
the
domain implements
whois
guard to redact
the information
in the entry.
Reputable organizations do
not implement
whois
guard
for operational
purposes
Determines
whether
the
hosting
location of the
domain
has
any suspicious
or
present
danger to the
organization

Excessive querying
for whois record
may result in a
temporary block by
the DNS server

Location position
may be inaccurate
for
near-border
locations and cloud
service providers.
GeoIP table requires
frequent
update to ensure
accuracy of the
detection system.

52
page
Operational
Risk
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query
N/A

+/-

-

-
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Table A.1 continued from previous
Description
Implementation
Challenges
26 Domain
Determines the Excessive querying
Registrar reputation of for whois record
the
domain may result in a
registrar
temporary block by
the DNS server
#

Feature

27 File Attachment

If the file contains an executable or file
encryption

Encrypted
files
cannot
be
inspected
without
an
appropriate
password or key
and that the size
of a file may be
significantly large
for any analysis

53
page
Operational
Risk
Provider
for
whois
record
may
temporary
or
permanently block
the
detection system
depending
on rate and
frequency of
query
Large
files
may
overburden
the
inspection
system
for
analysis due
to complexity
of the file or a
variety of detection alerts
for matching
signatures

+/-

-

Appendix B

URL Identification Regex
Statements
The following presents three methods of identifying and matching URLs within
an e-mail message where B.1 and B.3 has the highest and lowest detection
accuracy, respectively.

B.1

@diegoperini

_^(?:(?:https?|ftp)://)(?:\S+(?::\S*)?@)?(?:(?!10(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})
(?!127(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})(?!169\.254(?:\.\d{1,3}){2})
(?!192\.168(?:\.\d{1,3}){2})(?!172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])(?:\.\d
{1,3}){2})(?:[1-9]\d?|1\d\d|2[01]\d|22[0-3])(?:\.(?:1?\d
{1,2}|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])){2}(?:\.(?:[1-9]\d?|1\d\d|2[0-4]\d
|25[0-4]))|(?:(?:[a-z\x{00a1}-\x{ffff}0-9]+-?)*[a-z\x{00a1}-\x{
ffff}0-9]+)(?:\.(?:[a-z\x{00a1}-\x{ffff}0-9]+-?)*[a-z\x{00a1}-\x{
ffff}0-9]+)*(?:\.(?:[a-z\x{00a1}-\x{ffff}]{2,})))(?::\d{2,5})
?(?:/[^\s]*)?$_iuS

B.2

Spoon Library

/(((http|ftp|https):\/{2})+(([0-9a-z_-]+\.)+(aero|asia|biz|cat|com|
coop|edu|gov|info|int|jobs|mil|mobi|museum|name|net|org|pro|tel|
travel|ac|ad|ae|af|ag|ai|al|am|an|ao|aq|ar|as|at|au|aw|ax|az|ba|bb
|bd|be|bf|bg|bh|bi|bj|bm|bn|bo|br|bs|bt|bv|bw|by|bz|ca|cc|cd|cf|cg
|ch|ci|ck|cl|cm|cn|co|cr|cu|cv|cx|cy|cz|cz|de|dj|dk|dm|do|dz|ec|ee
|eg|er|es|et|eu|fi|fj|fk|fm|fo|fr|ga|gb|gd|ge|gf|gg|gh|gi|gl|gm|gn
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|gp|gq|gr|gs|gt|gu|gw|gy|hk|hm|hn|hr|ht|hu|id|ie|il|im|in|io|iq|ir
|is|it|je|jm|jo|jp|ke|kg|kh|ki|km|kn|kp|kr|kw|ky|kz|la|lb|lc|li|lk
|lr|ls|lt|lu|lv|ly|ma|mc|md|me|mg|mh|mk|ml|mn|mn|mo|mp|mr|ms|mt|mu
|mv|mw|mx|my|mz|na|nc|ne|nf|ng|ni|nl|no|np|nr|nu|nz|nom|pa|pe|pf|
pg|ph|pk|pl|pm|pn|pr|ps|pt|pw|py|qa|re|ra|rs|ru|rw|sa|sb|sc|sd|se|
sg|sh|si|sj|sj|sk|sl|sm|sn|so|sr|st|su|sv|sy|sz|tc|td|tf|tg|th|tj|
tk|tl|tm|tn|to|tp|tr|tt|tv|tw|tz|ua|ug|uk|us|uy|uz|va|vc|ve|vg|vi|
vn|vu|wf|ws|ye|yt|yu|za|zm|zw|arpa)(:[0-9]+)?((\/([~0-9a-zA-Z
\#\+\%@\.\/_-]+))?(\?[0-9a-zA-Z\+\%@\/&\[\];=_-]+)?)?))\b/imuS

B.3

stephenhay

@^(https?|ftp)://[^\s/$.?#].[^\s]*$@iS

Appendix C

SF Delay on Lingspam Part 8
Group 16 URLs
A set of identified URLs as an initial cause to 4,846 ms delay in the SF lane for
inspection. Several URLS are of standard format while a mismatching occured
for http://@ while numerical formats such as http://3624108859 translated
to the IP address http://216.3.131.59/. The following shows a sample list
of identified URLs for analysis while the author omitted some results due to
profanity or non-professional terminologies:
http://@
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://www.virtcasino.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://www.ixpres.com
http://www.onlinemlm.com
http://www.promlm.com
http://3624108859
http://3511663956
http://3488977290
http://3510834019
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http://www.raquelscasino.com
http://www.tobet.com
http://www.nekonline.com.nek
http://www.mplayer.com
http://www.gamehub.net.thank
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://www.virtcasino.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://www.highway.bt.com
http://capitalfm.com
http://www.kaya-optics.com
http://www.truster.com
http://208.144.10.20
http://208.166.75.251
http://22

